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Introduction 
This policy brief argues that the challenge to effective labour market 
integration of migrants in Mexico is connected to three practical 
steps: implementing a joint working mechanism to allow stakeholders 
to exchange experiences and knowledge to further integration and 
strengthen labour inclusion processes; bringing together the local 
units for migrant support (Direcciones de Atención al Migrante),1 rel-
evant public institutions, civil society, and the private sector to create 
a solid network of services that migrants can access; and developing 
a regional strategy to give migrants more comprehensive access to 
services. Effective coordination and greater clarity regarding regulari-
zation process, however, is unlikely to be achieved if labour market 
policies are intended as a short-term response to the US effectively 
subcontracting asylum responsibilities to Mexico. 
The above recommendations are based on 60 semi-structured inter-
views with irregular migrants, civil society, local authorities and 
employers in Mexico and three focus groups that were conducted 
with research participants in Mexico City, Tapachula and Tijuana. 
This was complemented with field observations and the collection of 
documentary data over an 18-month period ending in October 2019.2 
The argument made here also builds on an analysis of recent reports 
and surveys carried out mostly in Mexico on the condition of people 
on the move.3
1. Every municipality must have one established by Ley de Migración y su 
Reglamento: Art. 2. 
2. This work was supported by H2020 Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions [752144].
3. See among many others: Hub Migración, https://kmhub.iom.int/es/; Informe 
Regional sobre Migración, https://rosanjose.iom.int/site/sites/default/files/
estudio_sica_-_actualizado_al_25._sept_2019_-_digital_compressed.pdf; 
World Migration Report: https://www.iom.int/wmr/
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This policy brief is particularly timely because of the 
pressure coming from the Trump administration to limit 
movement by asylum applicants to the United States 
(including threats of punitive tariffs) which has led the 
Mexican government to take exceptional measures to 
address what has been referred to at some point by the 
media and civil society as ‘the exodus’. On October 29, 
2018, the secretary of foreign affairs, Marcelo Ebrard, 
announced that Mexico was working with United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC) to create a development plan for 
Central America (the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2019-
2024) aimed to jumpstart economic projects—namely 
the Mayan Train4 and the Coatzacoalcos–Salina Cruz 
railway connection. Labour market integration was at the 
core of this new policy approach in which the regional 
integration of incoming migrants would become a reality 
through the availability of jobs. The plan also involved 
the issuance of visitor cards for humanitarian rea-
sons—’Tarjetas de Visitante por Razones Humanitarias’ 
(TVRH)—a special permit allowing migrants to legally 
stay in Mexico for a year, look for a job, and have access 
to Mexico’s public health services. 
Despite the initial fanfare, however, the plan failed to take 
off and has been put on hold. To begin with, the lack of 
effective coordination and clarity regarding regulariza-
tion processes hindered its actual implementation. Most 
importantly, and in fact rather contradictorily, the Mex-
ican government pushed further its securitization agenda 
by increasing the number of arrests and deporting thou-
sands of migrants crossing its territory. However, as we 
shall see in what follows, these developments are far from 
being surprising: they are (1) a reflection of Mexico’s 
unwillingness to act as a safe third-country within the 
framework of the US policy of migration containment; 
(2) caused by the absence of a clear and effective regulari-
zation policy in the country. 
Labour Integration: The Visitor Card For 
Humanitarian Reasons
At first sight, the TVRH seems to be just what is needed 
to address one of the key policy dilemmas of the Mex-
ican president, López Obrador: fulfilling the humani-
tarian duty of assisting irregular migrants and boosting 
4. The so-called ‘Mayan Train’ is a railroad development project 
seeking to boost tourism in the South, especially along the 
world-famous Mayan Riviera in the Mexican Caribbean coast.
economic development in the country while quenching 
Trump’s obsession with reducing immigration to historic 
lows. 
Heralded as an important measure of the new migration 
policy, the TVRH was issued by the National Migration 
Institute (INM— Mexico’s entity in charge of migration) 
from November 2018 onwards to Central Americans 
who had recently entered Mexico and were bound for the 
United States (Tab 1).5 These one-year permits allowed 
people to reside in Mexico, transit through its territory, 
and obtain a Unique Population Registry Code (CURP) 
which grants access to all public services. TVRH holders 
had access to healthcare, education, and employment, 
among other benefits. Most importantly, the permit 
gave migrants the right to work legally in Mexico. The 
INM stated it received more than 13,000 applications 
(including 2.649 filed by/for children and adolescents).6
On 18 January, 2019, the INM announced the end of the 
TVRH Pilot Program at the Mexico–Guatemala border, 
showing that this measure had not been considered a 
long-term migration management policy, but constituted 
an attempt to address the exceptional circumstances 
emerging from the ‘migrant caravans,’7 to ensure safe, 
orderly and regular migration for its members.8 How-
5. The INM grants the TVHR in the following situations: being 
a victim or witness of a crime; being an unaccompanied child; 
being an applicant for political asylum or refugee. In 2018, 
however, these cards were issued extraordinarily for people who 
arrived with the different caravans. This extraordinary measure 
lasted until February 2019. For more see IMUMI, 2019, 
Mexican Tarjetas de Visitante por Razones Humanitarias and 
Firm Resettlement: A Practice Advisory for Advocates. Mexico 
City: IMUMI. 
6. INM, 2019, Entrega de Tarjetas por Razones Humanitarias, 
Instituto Nacional de Migración, 
 https://www.gob.mx/inm/articulos/entrega-de-tarjetas-por-
razones-humanitarias?idiom=es
7. For approximately a decade, migrant ‘caravans’ have been 
organized by civil society organizations to accompany Central 
Americans as they transit through Mexico’s harsh territory 
as a means to improve their travel conditions and get the 
media’s attention. The route is traced based on the location of 
migrant shelters where they can spend the night and receive 
basic assistance, most of the time with agreements with 
transportation companies and state governments. The main 
feature of the 2018 caravans, however, was their spontaneous 
nature. Social media and easily accessible communication 
devices gathered an exceptional amount of people in contrast to 
the previous caravans—a phenomenon that has been called ‘the 
exodus’ by the media and civil society.
8. INM, 2019, Entrega de Tarjetas por Razones Humanitarias, 
Instituto Nacional de Migración, https://www.gob.
mx/inm/articulos/entrega-de-tarjetas-por-razones-
humanitarias?idiom=es
3 ■  Work Toward Integration: Labour Inclusion of Irregular Migrants in Mexico
ever, starting on 1 April, 2019, the Mexican department 
of Interior (SEGOB) reestablished the TVRH program 
due to the new ‘caravans’ arriving in Mexico. 
Not surprisingly, this announcement coincided with the 
Trump administration’s threats to close the US–Mexico 
border unless Mexican authorities prevented Central 
American migrants from reaching the US. The focus on 
providing work permits for migrants so that they stayed 
in Mexico can be read as yet another form of containment 
to keep Central American migrants away from the US 
and its labour market. The integration of migrants and 
refugees into the Mexican labour market follows clearly 
from the security and enforcement imperatives that have 
guided offshoring and containment by destination coun-
tries in the Global North. The United States intends to 
subcontract a large part of its migration policy to Mexico, 
which has an incentive to comply because of its consider-
able economic and social dependence on the US. 
If the US today clearly sees Mexico as a great filter, the 
TVRH can, in the minds of its proponents, be the perfect 
answer to address U.S. migration demands from Mexico 
by fostering economic development and turning Mexico 
into a ‘safe third country’. By facilitating regularization, 
the migrant population should ideally be able to enter 
the formal labour market, settle, improve their socioec-
onomic situation, and integrate in Mexico. Indeed, the 
Mexican labour can potentially incorporate migrants 
into its labour force, at least in theory. According to 
sources from Mexico’s National Employment Service 
(Servicio Nacional de Empleo, or SNE), there are cur-
rently 32,000 available positions in multiple sectors at the 
national level, mostly in the agro-industrial, assembling, 
and manufacturing fields. Additionally, President López 
Obrador has also announced the creation of thousands of 
jobs due to new mega-projects such as the Mayan Train.9 
As we shall see in what follows, however, the actual inclu-
sion of migrants is easier said than done.
9. President Lopez-Obrador stated: ‘Mexico will offer employment 
to Central American migrants. That is our work plan, that 
people who want to work in our country, get support, get 
a work visa. We should not only address the issue with 
deportations and forcible actions.’ See Martínez, Fabiola, Alma 
E. Muñoz, 2019, Tren Maya es aceptado por mayoría en sureste 
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Policies and Facts: Reality Check
Even if Mexico was ready to incorporate migrants into its 
labour market through the TVRH, people interviewed for 
this brief who were regularized through TVHR claimed 
that registration with the INM was time-consuming and 
cumbersome. For asylum seekers in particular, ‘reporting 
sessions’—the mandatory weekly check-ins at Mexico’s 
Refugee Council (COMAR) to sign a log book in order 
to demonstrate their ongoing interest in the case—were 
problematic since they led applicants to miss work. 
Employers and financial institutions (namely banks) were 
often unaware of the documentation they should ask for 
the migrants, and therefore could not offer the benefits 
provided under the TVRH. Many migrants declared that 
employers had rejected their visitor cards on the grounds 
that they were not entitled to permanent and regular 
employment since their document read ‘visitor.’ Man-
agers and top staff of local and national companies, which 
showed unawareness of the documentation and time 
required to hire migrants, clearly saw the process as red 
tape. Employers were unaware of public programs that 
furthered the labour inclusion of migrants, such as the 
National Employment Service (SNE) training program, 
through which employees are paid a minimum wage 
during the first three months in return for training and 
the commitment that the company will hire 80% of the 
program’s trainees.10 The same happened with financial 
institutions, which would request documentation at their 
discretion, from passports to proof of residence, birth 
certificates, and even criminal records. 11 
Civil society organizations dealt with multiple reports of 
wage theft, barriers to promotion, and potentially mis-
leading job advertisements. These situations were related 
to abuse and the absence of due diligence, such as forced 
resignation once a project had closed out. In many cases, 
applications from asylum seekers or temporary work visa 
holders were rejected by employers who thought the their 
status did not grant them access to a regular job. Many 
said that ‘if [they] can’t get a bank account, [they] will not 
get paid’, and so migrants found it impossible to build a 
good credit score and open a bank account. 
The absence of a clear employment policy and proper 
information access coincides with Mexico’s recent history 
of securitizing its southern border. In 2014, and coin-
10.  See Gobierno de Mexico, https://conocer.gob.mx/
11. It is worth noting, though, that some employers actively 
searched for a solution on their own, such as agreements or 
other forms of settlement with banks to allow migrants to open 
a payroll account faster.
ciding with the announcement of the Southern Border 
Plan (Programa Frontera Sur), deportations increased 
(Tab 2). With the claim of protecting migrants entering 
Mexico and increasing the security and prosperity of 
the region, the Plan increased the militarization of the 
southern border and exposed migrants to arbitrary arrests 
and deportation. According to Mexico’s Department of 
Interior (SEGOB), Mexico deported 94,970 migrants 
from the beginning of 2019 to August of that year, the vast 
majority of which were from Central America.12
The new labour policy has not put an end to Mexico’s 
crackdown on irregular migration. Even more worrying, 
the new government seems to have carried out deporta-
tions and arrests of migrants at greater speed. Between 
2014 and 2018, Mexico has arrested and deported almost 
650,000 people from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Hon-
duras along its south border (UPM, 2019). Since 2007 
there have been 1.2 million events of this type, very close 
to the 1.4 million apprehensions on the southern border 
of the USA.13 Furthermore, although the number of ref-
ugee applications in Mexico has multiplied very rapidly 
over the last four years—an increase of 1,143% between 
2014 and 2018—the budget allocated to COMAR has not 
increased in parallel.14 
The signing of the ‘U.S.–Mexico Joint Declaration’ on June 
7, 2019, confirmed this trend. Following Trump’s threat 
to impose a tariff of 5% on all US imports from Mexico 
(98% of its exports are to the US), the declaration effec-
tively compelled Mexico to take ‘unprecedented steps to 
increase enforcement to curb irregular migration.’15 The 
recent deployment of 6,000 National Guard troops along 
the southern border indicates that Mexico is determined 
to escalate the number of arrests. The 13 contingents of 
the newly formed National Guard operate like a milita-
rized police force, with 10 groups of 450 to 600 troops 
assigned to the border with Guatemala. Three additional 
contingents were deployed to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec 
in southern Mexico, a geographic chokepoint, to set up 
roadblocks and highway checkpoints to prevent migrants 
from moving further north.16
12. SEGOB, 2019, Datos Unidad de Politica Migratoria UPM, 
Gobierno de Mexico, http://portales.segob.gob.mx/es/
PoliticaMigratoria/Boletin_MyH
13. Ibid.
14. UNHCR 2019, Marco Integral Regional para la Protección y 
Soluciones, UNHCR, https://www.acnur.org/5be46de64.pdf
15. US Department of State, 2019, https://www.state.gov/u-s-
mexico-joint-declaration/
16. Nick Miroff, David J. Lynch and Kevin Sieff, 2019, ‘Mexico 
aims to avoid tariffs with potential deal limiting migrants 
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Chronicle of a Failure Foretold 
The labour integration of migrants through the TVRH 
had been hailed by a plethora of governments and insti-
tutions as the silver bullet to tackle the plight of irregular 
migration in the region. Nonetheless, Mexico’s govern-
ment seems to be rather reluctant to reimplement it, and 
current developments along the Southern border suggest 
that it may never take off. The obstacle does not lie in 
the absence of vacant positions in the Mexican labour 
market. So, what are the reasons behind Mexico’s unwill-
ingness to implement its labour policy?
Any serious consideration about labour integration of 
migrants into Mexico’s economy must include an analysis 
of the changing scenario of migration flows in Mexico 
and the United States. Historically, the southern border 
of the United States has been traversed mainly by Mex-
ican nationals. This group was comprised originally by 
indigenous peasants and seasonal workers from Mexi-
co’s central states of Michoacán, Guanajuato and Jalisco 
who, profiting from the proximity of the two countries, 
going north, allowing U.S. to deport Central American asylum 





binational agreements and well-established migration 
networks, began to migrate to the USA in the 1940s 
(Cornelius and Lewis, 2007). Yet Mexican migration 
has reversed, and its levels reached historical lows, while 
violence, economic dispossession, and political turmoil 
have led people from Central America and other coun-
tries to increasingly seek refuge in Mexico. According 
to IOM, 68% of Central American migrants arriving in 
Tijuana after November 2018 are still looking for alterna-
tive ways to enter the United States. Meanwhile, 22% are 
looking for a job in Mexico, and 4% want to go back to 
their country of origin.17 Full labour market integration 
of migrants would be a de facto legitimization of  Wash-
ington’s claims that Mexico is a ‘safe third country,’ giving 
US President Donald Trump the justification to seal the 
US southern border to most asylum seekers on the basis 
that their claims can be accommodated by Mexico. This 
may be just too much for Mexico.
To begin with, the drastic increase in asylum requests 
has crippled an already unprepared asylum system. 
According to the head of COMAR, Andrés Ramírez, the 
refugee agency is overwhelmed, with just 48 permanent 
17. IOM 2019, Reporte DTM, IOM,  
http://mexico.iom.int/reporte-dtm
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employees and an annual budget of only USD 1.2 mil-
lion.18 As of June 2019, the agency was handling 28,000 
pending cases of refugee status applications in Mexico, 
and Ramírez estimated that Mexico could reach 60,000 
asylum applications by the end of the year. This would 
be more than twice the 29,600 applications received 
throughout 2018. As the number of applications increases, 
so does the significant delay in processing cases.19
Most importantly, Mexico does not seem to have the 
capacity and adequate infrastructure to grant asylum to 
all Central American migrants trying to reach the United 
States. This is clearly visible if one takes a glance at the 
recent developments in Mexico norther border. As part 
of the 7 July migration agreements, all persons seeking 
asylum in the United States must wait in Mexico while 
their cases wind through court, a waiting time that is now 
estimated to be 6 to 18 months. This is simply an exten-
sion of the Trump administration’s ‘Migrant Protection 
Protocols’ (MPP), launched on January 2019, also known 
as the ‘Stay in Mexico’ (Quédate en México) program. 
Both programs’ implementation has led to the satura-
tion of Northern Mexico’s shelters in the cities of Tijuana, 
Ciudad Juárez, and Mexicali. According to INM, with 
the expansion of this policy on July 31, 2019, there were 
8,170 people registered under MPP waiting in Tijuana on 
Mexico’s northern border, a number that utterly exceeds 
the reception capacity of the Municipality.
Migrants’ integration into the main urban centres of 
Mexico is extremely difficult. In the absence of govern-
ment institutions capable of providing accommodation, 
religious and civil society groups have tried to fill the 
gap, but federal government budget cuts to citizen asso-
ciations have drastically diminished their ability to pro-
vide assistance. The result is that overcrowded shelters do 
not have sufficient space to accommodate all migrants, 
many of whom now lack both accommodation and legal 
support. Often waiting in cities with high levels of vio-
lence, where gangs and drug cartels operate, migrants 
are exposed to exploitation and violence. Migrants and 
asylum seekers have also become more ‘visible’ in Mexico 
and so too has xenophobic and racist sentiment towards 
them increased.20
18. Meyer, Maureen, and Gina Hinojosa, 2019, ‘Explainer: The 
Recent U.S.-Mexico Agreement to Address Regional Migration 
Flows,’ WOLA, https://www.wola.org/analysis/u-s-mexico-
agreement-migration/
19.  Ibid. 
20. Meyer, Maureen, and Gina Hinojosa, 2019, ‘Explainer: The 
Recent U.S.-Mexico Agreement to Address Regional Migration 
Conclusions: A Way Forward 
What the current Mexican administration is demon-
strating with its ambivalent celebration of cooperation 
and the enforcement of increasingly restrictive immi-
gration policies is its reluctance to become a ‘safe third 
country’. Mexico has little interest in addressing the cur-
rent migration flows in ways other than enforcement, 
especially if the US government does not do its share. 
Currently, however, the United States is doing very little. 
In October 2019, the US government announced a drastic 
reduction in the annual cap on resettlement—cutting the 
US intake to 18.000. 
Accordingly, the first decisive step toward a more effec-
tive implementation of labour integration in Mexico 
involves collaboration with the US government. This 
seems an unlikely prospect with the current administra-
tion, given the transactional and impulsive nature of US 
foreign policy under Trump, hardly geared to a long-term 
cooperation, especially in the field of migration. Yet, for a 
labour integration of migrants in Mexico to succeed, it is 
necessary that the United States fulfil its legal obligation 
toward immigrants and refugees, in addition to taking 
the responsibility granted by the country’s geographic 
and economic position.  
If the US shift from short-term approaches to long-
term cooperation is accomplished, the next step for a 
true labour inclusion to effectively work would be the 
establishment of a clear regularization policy by Mexico. 
Effective labour market inclusion of migrants requires 
that regulations be put into practice by facilitating the 
exchange of information issued by public and private 
stakeholders working in the labour migration field, and 
by implementing a joint work plan with clear roles and 
responsibilities for these stakeholders. The added value 
is clear: the TVRH grants holders regular stay for a year 
through a quick process that has no geographical con-
straints, as opposed to the asylum-seeking process, which 
requires claimants to stay in the same place until their 
case is resolved. Moreover, it allows holders to file asylum 
claims and have regular status during the process. 
Flows,’ WOLA, https://www.wola.org/analysis/u-s-mexico-
agreement-migration/
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We suggest three practical steps:
• Implementing a joint working mechanism to allow 
stakeholders to exchange experiences and knowl-
edge to further integration and strengthen labour 
inclusion processes. Cross-sectoral exchanges could 
progressively address needs, challenges and best 
practices. 
• Bringing together the local units for migrant sup-
port (Direcciones de Atención al Migrante),21 rel-
evant public institutions, civil society, and the pri-
vate sector to create a solid network of services that 
migrants can access. 
• Developing a regional strategy to give migrants more 
comprehensive access to the services. Staff are often 
not aware of the measures described above, and so 
the inclusion issues continue. IOM, along with the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), are imple-
menting pilot capacity-building programs in these 
offices, whereby staff learn how to efficiently refer 
migrants to safe and dignified labour opportuni-
ties, hence facilitating their integration and inclu-
sion. This strategy seeks to build community-specific 
capacities among the staff of the Migrant Assistance 
Directorate’s Office, turning it into a liaison office 
between the local National Employment Service’s 
Office, civil society, shelters—which often have their 
own vacant positions and labour inclusion units—, 
and the private sector. 
Given the magnitude and characteristics of migration 
in Mexico, as well as their implications for the country’s 
development, Mexico should work towards achieving a 
vision that considers migrants both subjects of rights and 
key development partners. Mexico’s new labour policy—
with its visitor card for humanitarian reasons—might not 
be the silver bullet to address irregular migration across 
the region, but if combined with appropriate policy mea-
sures in the United States, it could play a significant role 
in improving protection or promoting economic oppor-
tunities for both the state and the migrants. It should, 
therefore, not be considered an exceptional solution, but 
rather part of a long-term policy. 
21. Every municipality must have one established by Ley de 
Migración y su Reglamento: Art. 2. 
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